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Abstract 13 
 14 
There is a growing awareness that a whole-societal “Great Transformation” of Polanyian 15 
scale is needed to bring global developmental trajectories in line with ecological imperatives.  16 
The mainstream Sustainable Development discourse, however, insists in upholding the myth 17 
of compatibility of current, growth-based trajectories with biophysical planetary boundaries. 18 
This article explores potentially fertile complementarities among trendy discourses 19 
challenging conventional notions of (un)sustainable development – Human Development, 20 
Degrowth, and Buen Vivir –, and outlines pathways for their realization. Human 21 
Development presents relative transformative strengths in political terms, while Degrowth 22 
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holds keys to unlocking unsustainable material-structural entrenchments of contemporary 23 
socio-economic arrangements, and Buen Vivir offers a space of cultural alterity and critique 24 
of the Euro-Atlantic cultural constellation. The weaknesses or blind spots (‘Achilles heels’) 25 
of each discourse can be compensated through the strengths of the other ones, creating a 26 
dialogical virtuous circle that would open pathways towards a global new “Great 27 
Transformation”. As one of the main existing platforms for pluralist, strong-sustainability 28 
discussions, Ecological Economics is in a privileged position to deliberately foster such 29 
strategic discursive dialogue. A pathway toward such dialogue is illuminated through a model 30 
identifying and articulating key discursive docking points.  31 
 32 
Keywords: Transformation discourses, Strategic dialogue, Buen Vivir, Degrowth, Human 33 
Development 34 
1. Introduction: Ecological Economics and Development 35 
Ecological Economics (hereinafter EE) has been broadly called the "science of sustainability" 36 
(Costanza, 1991). Since the mid-1980s when a society and a journal were founded, EE 37 
scholars have been advocating a necessary dialogue between natural sciences and social 38 
sciences, more precisely, between economics and ecology. Following this multidisciplinary 39 
perspective, the EE community hesitantly engaged the debate on sustainable development 40 
(hereinafter SD)
1
 that unfolded since the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987. After 41 
                                                          
1 
 Instead of marking-out a clear concept, the idea of SD has forged a discursive field shaped by different 
appropriations, each with their own hypotheses about the nature and causes of the socio-environmental crisis 
and deriving proposals to address the latter (Dryzek, 2005; Hopwood et al., 2005; Lélé, 2013, 1991; Sachs, 
1997; Sneddon et al., 2006). In the numerous analyses of the discourse surrounding SD we find different ways 
of making sense of conflicting interpretations (Vanhulst and Zaccai, 2016). In line with Hopwood et al. (2005), 
we draw a distinction between (a) mainstream SD discourses (which understand sustainability as achievable 
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much discussion, the precise meaning of “sustainability” remains contested; however, there 42 
is consensus that EE stands for strong sustainability (as opposed to environmental 43 
economics, which would admit ‘weak sustainability’ standards) and for the weak 44 
comparability of values (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998). In this regard, representatives of EE 45 
positioned themselves critically vis-à-vis the Brundtland Commission (see specially 46 
Goodland et al., 1992; and Lélé, 1991). Yet, while reflections within EE regarding 47 
sustainability have been abundant, the notion of ‘development’ (often token a synonym of 48 
economic growth) remains largely unproblematized, both within the EE community and 49 
beyond.  50 
A singular exception was the rise of post-development as an intellectual critical current of 51 
development in the early 1990s (Escobar, 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997; Rist, 2002; 52 
Sachs, 2010). Post-development scholars were the first to fundamentally question the idea of 53 
global convergence towards the socio-economic model of the global North. In their 54 
understanding, such model is a mental, cultural and historical construct that has colonized 55 
the rest of the world and needs to be deconstructed, opening up, instead, a matrix of 56 
alternatives (Latouche, 2009).  57 
This critique eventually became one of the intellectual sources of EE, yet it never gained 58 
paradigmatic status within the EE scholarly community, let alone in wider political debates. 59 
In light of sustained (if not intensifying and/or accelerating) trends in global ecological 60 
degradation, coupled with mounting socio-political and socio-economic tensions, there is a 61 
                                                          
within existing social structures, with incremental, evolutionary reforms, as is the case for the Brundtland 
proposal or, more recently, the UN Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs); and (b) transformative trends 
demanding foundational changes in social power structures along with radically different forms of interrelation 
between humans and their natural environment. (see section 4. Transformation Discourses). 
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growing awareness
2
 that a “new Great Transformation” of contemporary societies and their 62 
development patterns on a Polanyian scale
3
 in the coming decades is likely inevitable, be it 63 
“by design or by disaster” (Reißig, 2011).  64 
It becomes increasingly clear that the mainstream techno-managerialist SD discourse, with 65 
its insistence in upholding the compatibility of current, growth-based trajectories with 66 
biophysical planetary boundaries, has exhausted much of its credibility after three decades 67 
of nearly undisputed worldwide dominance with meagre results, at best (Bäckstrand, 2011; 68 
Dryzek, 2005; Hannigan, 2006; Pelfini, 2005). Therefore, we argue that the post-69 
developmentalist critique needs to be mainstreamed if EE is to become a veritable force in 70 
promoting a socio-ecological transformation and rising as a powerful alternative to 71 
environmental economics. We will further argue that such mainstreaming is indeed possible 72 
                                                          
2  In this vein, studies of Social Metabolism (often published in EE) have offered detailed and influential 
analyses on the current trajectories that make necessary a global socioecological transition – for an overview, 
see Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl (2007). This work has led to a recent UNEP report (2016) questioning alleged 
global trends towards “dematerialization”. 
3  The work of Karl Polanyi has experienced a revival in recent years (Somers and Block, 2014), 
whereby his opus magnum “The Great Transformation” (1944) is widely regarded as the most compelling 
analytical and metaphorical account of the scale of changes lying ahead for modern societies in the 21
st
 century. 
Moreover, Polanyi’s work emphasizes a further unfamiliar aspect of modern capitalism in contemporary 
thought, namely: capitalism as a relatively new system of accumulation that was introduced via a great violent 
transformation. Susan Paulson comments: “[Growth] is perceived as apolitical and impartial; modern markets, 
in particular, appear as timeless mechanisms through which all humans freely organize livelihoods and establish 
value. Polanyi (1944) showed they are anything but. The commodification of labor and nature, together with 
the colonization of human habits and worldviews by market-relations and money-value, are historical exceptions 
brutally imposed in 18th and 19th century England by efforts to ‘mold human nature’ for industrial growth” 
(Paulson, 2017, p. 440). The historically unique challenge regarding the upcoming transformation into an 
ecologically viable society, however, as opposed to unintended and unplanned ‘great transformations’ of the 
past (i.e. the Neolithic and the industrial revolutions), is advancing a comprehensive re-structuration “for 
reasons of insight, prudence, and foresight”. The “long breaking-distance” – i.e. the time gap between the 
moment of generation of causes and the moment of observability of effects – of many global environmental 
problems (e.g. climate change) requires avoiding the standard historic reaction of changing direction in response 
to crises and disasters. In order to succeed, the transformation must be anticipated (WBGU, 2011, p. 5) 
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through the synergic articulation of existing discursive forces
4
 within the EE community which 73 
challenge conventional notions of (un)sustainable development. The aim of this article is to 74 
illuminate pathways towards such synergic articulation, by focusing analytically on three 75 
representative ‘transformation discourses’ from within a much broader discursive universe 76 
within EE.  77 
The article begins by critically assessing the mainstream concept of development and the 78 
capacity of the Human Development (hereafter HD) discourse – arguably the most serious 79 
attempt at self-criticism coming from within mainstream the development worldview – to 80 
effectively facilitate a socio-ecological transformation matching the scale dictated by global 81 
ecological imperatives. It then goes on to introduce two emblematic ‘transformation 82 
discourses’5 springing-off the post-developmental critique in the Global North and South, 83 
respectively: Degrowth (hereafter DG) and Buen Vivir (BV). Each one is assessed in their 84 
transformative potential and weaknesses, to finally propose an integrative framework for a 85 
fertile mutual engagement among the three discourses and outline pathways for their 86 
realization towards a “Great Transformation”. As one of the main existing platforms for 87 
pluralist, strong-sustainability discussions, EE would arguable be in a unique position to host 88 
such inter-discursive dialogue, building on earlier contributions to the journal of Ecological 89 
Economics (Kothari et al., 2014; Sneddon et al., 2006). 90 
                                                          
4  ‘Discourse’ is to be understood here as a structured way of symbolically ordering the world. We shall 
distinguish two dimensions: “discourse as representation” describes ideational contents of a discourse in an 
abstract manner; while “discourse as practice” looks at the context and material situatedness of discourses. Both 
dimensions contribute to the understanding of the potential and limits of identified complementarities between 
the three iconic discourses dealt with in this article. 
5  Following Arturo Escobar’s (2011) concept of ‘Discourses of Transition’ or ‘Transformation 
Discourses’ is used here as a shortcut for discourses generally promoting a Great Transformation. 
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2. Setting the scene: A critical analysis of Development 91 
The notion of development did long enjoy a virtually unquestioned legitimacy since its debut 92 
in the political jargon (attributed to US President Truman’s inaugural speech in 1949): from 93 
Rostow’s ‘stages of economic growth’, through Dependency Theory and Endogenous 94 
Development, up to ‘sustainable development’, all have hailed the idea of development as 95 
the promised land of all historical trajectories.  96 
Decades after the notion of ‘development’ spread around the globe, the vast majority of the 97 
world keeps struggling to emulate the ‘developed countries’, while both ‘developed’ and 98 
‘developing’ ones keep operating at an enormous ecological and social cost. The problem 99 
does not lie, as it may, in any given implementation-flaws of essentially adequate development 100 
strategies; but rather lies in the concept of development itself. The world experiences 101 
widespread "maldevelopment" (Amin, 1990; Tortosa, 2001). This includes those countries 102 
regarded as industrialized, i.e. countries whose lifestyle has served as a beacon for ‘backward 103 
countries’, concealing the fact that these are “imperial modes of living” which are inherently 104 
non-generalizable (Brand and Wissen, 2011), as became apparent, at the very latest, with the 105 
global ecological crisis of resource overconsumption and biosphere degradation. As Susan 106 
Paulson argues: “If climate crisis has a silver lining, it may be the power to provoke residents 107 
of high-GDP high-emission countries to question the portrayal of their own societies as 108 
‘developed’” (Paulson, 2017, p. 432).  109 
In light of these issues, it seems urgent to decouple the idea of ‘development’ (or whatever 110 
we chose to call some kind of positive human evolution) from unidirectional, mechanistic, 111 
and reductionist view of economic growth. Ultimately, the conception of ‘progress’ itself, 112 
which underpins the development-ideology,  needs to be re-politicized (Chakrabarty, 2009). 113 
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However, the question is not only about dissolving entrenched misleading narratives: 114 
thinking outside the development-fence requires new narratives.  115 
Some EE scholars have indeed opened the debate and included new perspectives, but have 116 
done so in a somewhat ambiguous and inconsequential way, avoiding to take a clear-cut 117 
position on fundamental debates like the one on the relation between environment and 118 
growth. We argue that any promising engagement with the goal of sustainability at this point 119 
involves a fundamental questioning of SD (in its mainstream discursive variants) as a plausible 120 
and desirable horizon for the global political economy. With this aim, the following section 121 
reviews the Human Development (HD) discourse as the most widely covered development-122 
revisionist approach within and outside EE, with the purpose of unveiling both its potential 123 
and limitations in the sense of a global ‘great transformation’ towards a type of society which 124 
is actually “capable of a future” (WBGU, 2011). 125 
3. Human development  126 
The ideas of HD and more precisely of the Capability Approach (hereafter CA) have been 127 
gradually introduced to EE in the mid 2000’s (Ballet et al., 2013; i.a. Lehtonen, 2004; Pelenc 128 
and Ballet, 2015; Sneddon et al., 2006). The fundamental question is whether the CA can 129 
offer suitable theoretical and ethical foundations (in particular, its idea of justice) for a great 130 
transformation towards global sustainability.  131 
Ideas of Human Development (HD)
6
 have become strongly associated with the work of the 132 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the publication of their annual 133 
                                                          
6  When we speak of HD we consider only the literature associated with the CA and not the Human 
Scale Development Theory developed by Manfred Max-Neef (1991). This approach is quite different (for a 
comparison with the CA see Guillen-Royo, 2015; Pelenc, 2016). 
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reports (United Nations Development Programme, 1990). Offering a novel articulation of 134 
the space for individual agency, the HD paradigm enshrined a need for understanding 135 
development as being ‘development of the people by the people, for the people’(United 136 
Nations Development Programme, 1991, p. 13). The contribution of HD can be understood 137 
in two main domains: their consideration of development moved away (a) from a pure 138 
economic-based understanding – the one measured in GDP –, and (b) from a purely state-139 
centred understanding, to one where the people become the main agents of development. 140 
HD’s shift to people-centred approaches was underpinned by the CA, most notably 141 
articulated by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 2000; Nussbaum and Sen, 142 
1993; Sen, 1999, 1989). 143 
HD explicitly seeks to escape the fixation with material goods (as opposed to, for example, 144 
the basic human needs-approach
7) and focusing instead in the expansion of people’s freedom 145 
to choose. In the CA, such expansion of freedom is inherently connected to the expansion 146 
of agency, i.e., to a process of individual  empowerment (Alkire, 2009; Ibrahim and Alkire, 147 
2007). Hence, here development is understood as the removal of several forms of 148 
'unfreedom' or barriers that prevent the individual from exerting their own agency and choice 149 
to transform their own reality. In a nutshell: the CA offers a framework for addressing the 150 
multidimensionality of human well-being escaping from narrow definitions based on 151 
economic growth, and it gives a central role to freedom of choice and public deliberation in 152 
the definition and assessment of well-being. 153 
                                                          
7  The Basic Needs Approach was strongly criticised by Sen and the HD literature in general for (i) its 
materialistic fixation, (ii) being too paternalistic and (iii) neglecting to consider opportunities (Deneulin and 
Shahani, 2009, p. 58; Sen, 1980). 
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Progressively, these ideas have permeated the praxis of development, mainstreaming the idea 154 
of a people-centred approach (either politically or economically grounded) as the 155 
fundamental means to achieve SD. Yet, simultaneously, the CA has restricted the possibility 156 
of engaging in a debate about a more radical transformation of the premises of development 157 
altogether. In fact, HD can be seen as a successful exercise of co-optation of some of the 158 
critiques to development, analogous to what the concept of ‘sustainable development’ did 159 
with the debate on limits to growth. In HD, ideas of development remain tied to Western, 160 
liberal democratic frameworks and to market economies (Carballo, 2015; Selwyn, 2014; 161 
Walsh, 2010). Even if the successful mainstreaming of the focus on freedom offers a 162 
necessary space of reflection, ideas of HD, in and of themselves, offer little space to address 163 
the multiple and imbricated complexities and challenges associated with the growing 164 
environmental crisis
8
. HD and the CA have also been strongly criticized for their individualist 165 
focus and assumptions, which downplay the role of individual embeddedness in cultural 166 
norms and inertias, institutional contexts, and material infrastructures. This problem has 167 
been partially addressed by some scholars under the heading of ‘collective capability’ (Pelenc 168 
et al., 2015), yet it remains a key limitation of the CA. 169 
Overall, HD offers the possibility of constructing a more socially-conscious notion of 170 
development, where political, environmental, cultural and egalitarian concerns can receive 171 
more attention than in conventional economistic conceptions. However, it offers very little 172 
space to engage in systemic or macro-structural considerations of the limits and challenges 173 
associated to the promotion of development. The expansionist imperative of global 174 
                                                          
8  See Lessmann & Rauschmayer (2013), Carballo (2016), Shrivastava & Khotari (2012), and Martinez-
Alier, Temper & Demaria (2015). 
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capitalism, with its systematic production of inequalities and environmental degradation, is 175 
not even identified in the CA as an obstacle in the road towards HD (Shrivastava and Kothari, 176 
2012). 177 
The discourses to be reviewed in the following sections place such systemic considerations 178 
at the very centre of their diagnosis and prognosis. With Escobar (2011), we call them 179 
transformation or transition discourses because they seek to redefine the political-economic 180 
chessboard set by industrial societies (Dryzek, 2005), and transcend the normative horizon 181 
of the development discourse thus opening up space for alternative conceptions of 182 
prosperity. 183 
 184 
4. Transformation Discourses  185 
From the perspective of their content, what Escobar calls ‘discourses of transformation’ are 186 
not a novelty of the 21
st
 Century; they are rather part of the long search for and practice of 187 
alternative ways of living, forged in the furnace of humanity’s struggle for emancipation and 188 
enlightenment. What is remarkable about these alternative proposals, however, is that 189 
despite the fact that they typically arise from traditionally marginalized groups (often 190 
majorities rather than minorities within the population), their critique is not limited to issues 191 
of social justice, but are also aimed at denouncing social pathologies. Or, more precisely: 192 
their critique of social injustice is rooted in a critique of social pathologies. Indeed, their 193 
diagnosis of departure is one of civilizational crisis, and, consequentially, their prescriptions 194 
break away (to variable degrees) from the idea of development, which is rooted in modern 195 
Western-style civilization. The quest for unlimited growth as equated with progress is 196 
generally contested by all transformation discourses, as are Western materialism, 197 
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anthropocentrism, the destruction of the commons, and blind faith in science and 198 
technology. 199 
While utopian projects are often regarded as typically localized experiments with alternative 200 
forms of collective organization (e.g. eco-villages and other intentional communities), the 201 
distinctive feature of transformation discourses is, in turn, their aspiration of bending 202 
developmental trajectories worldwide. Such global aspirations are put forward, for example, 203 
by feminisms and eco-feminism, some indigenous and peasants’ movements (e.g. La Via 204 
Campesina), by the proposal of post-development, by the defense of sentient beings and the 205 
‘rights of nature’, by the growing global discourses and movements for Environmental Justice, 206 
Post-extractivism, Social Economy, Degrowth, the Commons, Convivialism, Food 207 
sovereignty, the Latin-American Buen vivir, and also by a weaker movement for eco-208 
Marxism and, eco-socialism
9
, among others. Furthermore, some of these discourses have 209 
undergone political experimentation: Eco-Swaraj in India, Bhutan’s ‘Gross National 210 
Happiness’ and radical eco-centered politics in food production, or else the ‘rights of nature’ 211 
in Ecuador, Bolivia, India, and Australia, among other examples. 212 
To be sure, despite their global aspirations, these are still situated discourses, born as 213 
proposals for fundamental change in (g)localized settings. In a context of post-political 214 
(Swyngedouw, 2011) and post-democratic (Blühdorn, 2011; Crouch, 2004; Rancière, 2007; 215 
                                                          
9  It goes without saying that not all of the discourses listed here stand on equal footing regarding the 
scope of their respective transformative implications: the fundamental critique of the growth-dependence of 
capitalist economies, for example, has farther-reaching implications in terms of a whole-societal transformation 
than, say, the demand for food sovereignty, which is centered on the gaining control over food production and 
distribution back from footloose agribusiness-corporations and restoring it to peasants. Yet all listed discourses 
tend to converge in their fundamental critique of contemporary industrialist and capitalist societies. And most 
of these discourses do find resonance within the EE literature: post-extractivism, for example, fits perfectly well 
with the abundant literature in EE on ecologically unequal trade while eco-feminist economics has had special 
issues in the journal. 
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Ritzi, 2014) global governance, transformation discourses intend to re-politicize the debate 216 
on the much-needed socio-ecological transformation, affirming dissidence with the currently 217 
dominant representations of the world and offering alternative ones. 218 
Yet, the proponents of these discourses seem to build their proposals in a somewhat 219 
autarchic way without considering each other’s struggles and their potential for synergic 220 
common cause towards what they variably refer to as “system change”, “paradigm shift” or 221 
else “civilizational shift”. Scholars and activists alike (Brand, 2015; D’Alisa et al., 2014; 222 
Escobar, 2015; Kothari et al., 2014; Narberhaus and Sheppard, 2015; Sneddon et al., 2006) 223 
are increasingly advocating a strategic dialogue among transition discourses as key for a 224 
“Great Transformation” towards sustainability. 225 
The following sections introduce Degrowth (DG) and Buen Vivir (BV) as two emblematic 226 
transformation discourses – the former from the global North and the latter from the South 227 
–, which catalyze many of the views and critiques of other critical discourses represented in 228 
the EE literature: for example, key insights from agroecology, eco-feminism, convivialism, 229 
etc. are part and parcel of DG; while post-extractivism, indigenous worldviews, etc. are 230 
implicit in BV. Furthermore, DG and BV – thus our argument to be developed – are 231 
particularly suitable candidates for a promising strategic dialogue with the more established 232 
HD.  233 
4.1. Degrowth  234 
Although the term ‘degrowth’ had been coined by André Gorz in 1972, this discourse 235 
experienced a strong revival about 10 years ago, when European social movements adopted 236 
it as a “missile word” to challenge the inherent ecological and social unsustainability of a 237 
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growth-obsessed political economy and a correspondingly growth-dependent global 238 
economy (Latouche, 2009).  239 
DG “challenges the hegemony of growth and calls for a democratically led redistributive 240 
downscaling of production and consumption […] as a means to achieve environmental 241 
sustainability, social justice and well-being” (Demaria et al., 2013, p. 209). Hence from the 242 
outset, DG not only challenges economistic approaches to development: it actually pits 243 
economic growth and development against each other, thus re-politicizing the otherwise 244 
ideological notion of development (Asara et al., 2015).  245 
To promote a “downscaling of production and consumption” is not to be conflated with 246 
steering growth-dependent economies into economic slowdown, which would cause 247 
recession, unemployment, inequality, leading to austerity-politics and the violation of 248 
environmental agreements (Alexander and Rutherford, 2014). What DG promotes, instead, 249 
is the creation of a different societal structure, transforming current institutions and rules, 250 
promoting a different balance of material and non-material forms of prosperity: time 251 
prosperity, ‘relational goods’ (friendship, neighborliness, etc.), non-capitalistic, community-252 
based forms of production, exchange, and consumption, among other things, regain 253 
centrality in social and individual life vis-à-vis today’s unfettered material consumerism. In 254 
this sense, DG can be better understood as ‘atheism’ in relation to the ‘dogma’ of economic 255 
growth. In fact, it is aimed at taking distance from the growth imaginary and decolonizing 256 
society of its influence (D’Alisa et al., 2014; Latouche, 2009).  257 
Although relatively new as a scholarly concept – some authors have declared 2008, the year 258 
of the first international degrowth conference, as its academic birth date (Schneider et al., 259 
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2010) –, the DG discourse has been informed by multiple intellectual sources 10, which can 260 
be synthesized in two main strands (Latouche, 2009): the culturalist strand, including both 261 
the critique to development as ideology and to utilitarianism (Castoriadis, 1999; Escobar, 262 
2015; Hamilton, 2003; Illich, 1973; Leff, 2008; Martinez-Alier, 1994; Polanyi, 1944; Rist, 263 
2002; Robbins, 2004) and the ecological strand (Daly and Townsend, 1993; Georgescu-264 
Roegen, 1971; Meadows et al., 1972), including both the disciplines of EE and Political 265 
Ecology.  266 
Overall, the body of literature that addresses the economic, social and ecological limits to 267 
growth argues that, first, the universalization of Western affluence-standards is ecologically 268 
unsustainable; second, that it has historically been proven unfeasible; and, third, that where 269 
it has been achieved, it has not even led to happiness (Alexander and Rutherford, 2014).  270 
DG is not just a critique of the growth-obsession and -dependence of the global economy, 271 
and the acknowledgement of physical and social limits to growth; it also involves a pro-active, 272 
transformative aim of moving towards a model of (post-)development that can dispense with 273 
a structural growth-imperative
11
. To do this, a systemic political, institutional and cultural shift 274 
is required. In the post-growth world “expansion will no longer be a necessity, and economic 275 
rationality and goals of efficiency and maximization will not dominate all other social 276 
rationalities and goals” (Kallis, 2011, p. 875). The desirable end-state of DG can be 277 
synthesized as a society that prioritizes the maintenance of the ecological integrity of the 278 
planet, on the one hand, and embraces the sufficiency-principle as its lifestyle to lessen 279 
                                                          
10  For a broader and deeper classification of the intellectual sources that nourishes DG, see Demaria et 
al. (2013). 
11  For a synthetic and transparent explanation of the mechanisms at the root of modern economies’ 
dependence on economic growth, see Jackson (2009). 
15 
 
inequalities and increase well-being, on the other (Alexander and Rutherford, 2014; 280 
Schneidewind and Zahrnt, 2014). 281 
4.2. Buen Vivir  282 
The BV discourse has often been defined as a dialogical alternative to development. It arises 283 
in a particular historical–political juncture at the interface of the local – where decades-long 284 
indigenous struggles for cultural and material recognition, eventually converged with the 285 
disenchantment of the masses with the neoliberal order at the dawn of the century (Altmann, 286 
2015) – and the global, where the capacity of the development paradigm to offer satisfactory 287 
responses to the grave social, environmental, and economic challenges of our time had been 288 
losing ground over the last twenty years, and could no longer be taken for granted (Vanhulst 289 
and Beling, 2014, p. 61). In other words, BV can be said to have emerged from a historically 290 
fortuitous glocal convergence of multiple struggles at various scales, which influenced larger 291 
cultural and political restructuration (Beling and Vanhulst, 2016).  292 
Beyond the idea of interdependence between society and its natural environment 293 
(crystallized here in the concept of Pachamama or “mother Earth”), in BV, ontological and 294 
epistemological plurality is constitutive of culture. BV thus implies a fundamental rupture 295 
with Eurocentric universalism (as well as the dichotomies therefrom derived, such as nature-296 
society dualism) (Vanhulst and Beling, 2014). Beyond the normative orientations BV offers, 297 
however, what makes this retro-progressive utopia so mesmerizing is the impact it has had 298 
on the macro-cultural and political spheres of some Latin American countries, above all 299 
Bolivia and Ecuador, where BV has attained constitutional status as the basis of their “social 300 
contract”.  301 
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As has been shown in detail elsewhere (Vanhulst, 2015; Vanhulst and Beling, 2014), while 302 
BV became anchored in the socio-cognitive and cultural landscape and in certain socio-303 
political practices in the Andean-Amazonian region, its content has been diversified, forking 304 
into a range of more or less (di)similar discourses respectively re-articulated by the successive 305 
groups that have adopted and adapted it. Hence, one should rather speak of Buenos vivires, 306 
in the plural (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014; Loera Gonzalez, 2015; Vanhulst, 2015). In fact, 307 
a consensus-definition of BV is not available. This undefinition is probably also key to its 308 
magnetism and strength. Eduardo Gudynas (2011) thus speaks of BV as a work-in-progress, 309 
to be understood as a dialogical platform rather than as a clear and precise concept.  310 
Yet a systematization of commonalities and differences among the diverse BV-discourses is 311 
possible. Three main strands can be identified: an indigenist, a socialist and an academic one 312 
(Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014; Vanhulst, 2015; Vanhulst and Beling, 2014, 2013). From this 313 
heterogeneous set, we can distinguish four common constitutive elements of BV: (a) the idea 314 
of harmony with nature (including its abiotic components); (b) vindication of the principles 315 
and values of marginalized/subordinated peoples; (c) the State as guarantor of the satisfaction 316 
of basic needs (such as education, health, food and water), social justice and equality; and (d) 317 
democracy. There are also two cross-cutting lines: BV as a critical paradigm of Eurocentric 318 
(anthropocentric, capitalist, economistic and universalistic) modernity, and as a new 319 
intercultural political project. 320 
Thus BV seek to re-politicize the collective reflection about the socio-economic and 321 
ecological drifts of the currently prevailing development paradigm and its capacity to 322 
successfully address the socio-ecological sustainability imperative. Similarly to DG and to the 323 
discourse of limits of the 1970s (Dryzek, 2005), BV advocates a radical reorientation of the 324 
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paradigm of endless growth. However, BV rejects the ‘promethean’ backbone of the 325 
discourse on limits to growth, which remains captive to the playbook of industrialism 326 
(particularly with regard to the undisputed supremacy awarded to economic, bureaucratic, 327 
and scientific elites). From the perspective of BV, what is needed is, instead, overcoming the 328 
structures of industrial society and conceiving of new ways of relating to the natural 329 
environment – all this through the democratization of all spheres of social life..  330 
 331 
The indigenous dimension of BV operates as an inspiration drawn from the aborigine 332 
cultural imaginaries of the Andean and Amazonian world, which are rooted in traditional 333 
ethical foundations, values, and beliefs vis-à-vis nature that industrial civilization has tended 334 
to erase. The emergence of BV thus reinforces the multiple voices (eco-socialist, eco-335 
feminist, anti-capitalist, convivialist, environmental justice, etc.) denouncing the ethnocentric 336 
and anthropocentric limitations of Western-style conceptions of development and progress, 337 
which still heavily gravitate in the SD discourse. 338 
 339 
Table 1 below synthesizes the ideational content of the three discourses reviewed above. 340 
 341 
Table 1. Main features of the three different discourses analysed 342 
 343 
 HD DG BV 
Origin of the discourse -1990s,  
-International level (Global 
North but with rapid spread in 
Global South through UNDP) 
-1970s, revival in 2000s, 
-Western Europe 
- Early 2000s, combining 
modern and ancient worldviews 
-South America 
Main message People-centred development  Infinite growth on a finite planet 
is impossible and undesirable 
Living well rather than living 
‘better’. 
Main goal conditions and expanding 
capabilities that allow people to 
flourish  
Challenge the hegemony of 
growth and propose alternatives 
to it 
Living well in harmony with 
other humans and the rest of 
nature 
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Means and actors 
conveying the discourse 
UN and other international 
development agencies 
Grassroots alternatives, 
oppositional activism and 
academia (e.g. international 
conferences) 
Andean communities and 
governments, grassroots 
movements and academia 
Ontology -Dualism Nature/culture 
-Individualism (wellbeing 
defined at the individual level) 
-Dualism/ anthropocentrism, 
even if there is a call to change 
human-nature relationship 
-Individual and collective level 
are regarded as complementary 
-Holism (humans are not 
distinguished and separated 
from the rest of nature in the 
Western sense) 
-Predominance of the collective 
level (community) 
 
Perspective on growth and 
development 
Focus on HD instead of solely 
on GDP growth (growth can be 
a means but not an end) 
Growth is the problem and the 
idea of growth-driven 
development should be 
overcome 
Growth is the problem and 
positioning with regard to 
development is ambiguous 
(ranging from total rejection as 
ideologically laden to more 
conciliatory attempts) 
Natural environment The natural environment 
should be preserved as a means 
of guaranteeing present and 
future human freedoms 
Acknowledgment of limits of the 
biosphere; decrease in 
production and consumption; 
voluntary simplicity 
Intrinsic value and Rights of 
Nature; spiritual relationship 
with nature 
Culture Even if this discourse maintains 
the idea of development as a 
goal, the importance of cultural 
diversity is acknowledged 
Acknowledgement that the 
definition of a good life is 
culturally diverse. Ecological 
sustainability and social equity as 
as lowest-common-denominator 
cultural goals. 
- Culture as a key force driving 
history. Acknowledgment of 
cultural diversity, 
multiculturality; 
Importance of a spirituality;  
Importance of indigenous 
knowledge 
State Nation-state and social welfare 
but also individual and 
community empowerment 
Nation-state and social welfare 
but with more democracy; 
community experiences that 
might prefigure a post-growth 
society. 
Multi-cultural 
and Plurinational state,  
Centrality of the community 
level 
Market Market as a means to human 
flourishing, not as an end 
Markets as one means of socio-
economic organization among 
others (commons, reciprocity, 
etc.) Advocate a de-
commodification of the world 
 
Stronger emphasis on de-
commodification of the world; 
solidarity economy 
Governance  Deliberative governance Diversity of positions: from 
parliamentary democracy up to 
bottom-up governance. 
Participatory and bottom-up 
governance 
Source: own elaboration 344 
 345 
 346 
5. Discursive cross-pollination and synergic engagement among discourses 347 
Having reviewed the three discourses HD, BV, and DG, this section seeks to assess the 348 
knowledge-gain and socio-political leverage that each discourse offers, on the one hand, and 349 
their blind spots and weaknesses (or ‘Achilles heels’), on the other. This will help pave the 350 
way towards understanding what can (and what cannot) be expected from each of the 351 
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discourses as a contribution towards a “Great Transformation”, and how they could 352 
potentially fertilize and be articulated with each other.  353 
5.1. Buen Vivir: heralding the cultural transformation  354 
BV can be considered as the worldwide first large-scale experiment of discursive articulation 355 
of modern and non-modern ontologies (also at the level of the institutional-material sphere). 356 
Indeed, BV is the expression of a cultural shift of epic proportions, which results in a fruitful 357 
paradox: the indigenous cultural heritage, which was (and often still is) seen as mutually 358 
exclusive with the development paradigm, is now re-framed as key to the renewal of the latter 359 
(Carballo, 2015). In this sense, BV highlights the limitations of (Eurocentric) modern 360 
ontology: linearity, individualism, anthropocentrism, expansionism, instrumental rationality, 361 
etc.; and set up the principles of circularity, relationality, biocentrism, holism, and an 362 
“environmental rationality” (Leff, 2004). 363 
However, the success of BV as a government program can be safely considered to be limited, 364 
at best. This should not come as a surprise: the structural dependence of the Ecuadorean 365 
economy on a (neo-)extractivist matrix puts a systemic cap onto the ability of governments 366 
and social movements to effectively challenge the omnipotence of markets in the neoliberal 367 
global economy (Vanhulst, 2015). Proposals and technically feasible measures towards 368 
overcoming such dependence are not in short supply, yet the structural political 369 
preconditions for implementing them are not in place: “The implementation of realistic and 370 
rational proposals has little chance of being adopted and still less chance of succeeding unless 371 
[the social imaginary is fundamentally subverted through] the fertile utopia of a convivial and 372 
autonomous society” (Latouche, 2009, p. 66). It is thus in this realm of radical cultural 373 
subversion that the strength of BV has to be located.  374 
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Yet in this vein, a further question inevitably arises: can this Andean retro-progressive utopia 375 
potentially inspire change also in the West? Is there any room for cultural resonance for the 376 
eco-convivial imaginary of BV in the European worldview? Indeed, framing BV as an 377 
idiosyncratic, ethno-centred phenomenon would make it of little relevance to debates about 378 
how to bend the global developmental trajectory. Nevertheless, such framing would obscure 379 
a large part of the explanation of how BV emerged, in the first place:  as existing scholarly 380 
engagement with the genesis of BV shows
12
, this discursive innovation did require the 381 
ideational input from and the agency of both indigenous actors and Western actors (e.g. 382 
development and environmental international agencies, such as GIZ, Pachamama Alliance; 383 
Acción Ecológica; as well as intellectuals and politicians).  384 
In other words, the domestic political and cultural movement shaping BV through the living 385 
resonance of indigenous civilizations of the Andes and the Amazon was met by a global 386 
movement of political contestation over the prevailing global development model, seeking 387 
to establish links of territorial legitimacy by docking to longstanding local struggles (Beling 388 
and Vanhulst, 2016). Thus, BV constitutes a prime example of glocal discursive articulation 389 
in search for post-growth and post-colonialist utopias. This process of ‘glocalization’ 390 
constitutes the backdrop against which the discursive repertoire of BV developed; 391 
furthermore, it offers valuable lessons when viewed from a genealogical perspective, as a 392 
structural re-balancing of political forces disruptive of “politics as usual” (De La Cadena, 393 
2010).  394 
                                                          
12  See, for example, Altmann (2015) and Espinosa (2015). 
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BV thus appears as both a product and a strong source of cultural transformative waves, 395 
matching long marginalized voices from the global South with a global momentum for a 396 
discursive shift. This has been and continues to be its main performativity as a social 397 
movement and as a political project. In its ambition regarding programmatic deliverables, 398 
however, the Ecuadorean and Bolivian experiments with BV simultaneously showcase the 399 
limitations of a political revolution without an effective transformation of the material base. 400 
5.2. Degrowth: envisioning the material-structural transformation 401 
If the fundamental transformation of culture is the core business of BV, the transformation 402 
of the material base is that of the DG discourse.  403 
Indeed, while DG contains many counter-cultural docking points that resonate with BV (e.g. 404 
the decolonization of the imaginary), the focus here is on the transformation of material 405 
structures as a condition of possibility for a broader societal transformation. Basing on the 406 
fundamental insight that infinite growth is unviable in a finite planet (which draws on the 407 
intellectual tradition of Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen, Kenneth Boulding, and Herman Daly, 408 
all prominent figures of ecological economics), growth-critics have developed an in-depth 409 
understanding of the mechanisms locking contemporary capitalist economies into a growth-410 
path. Consequentially, they have elaborated a number of technical-programmatic measures 411 
of varied ideological inspiration
13
, which, if implemented, could dissolve the structural 412 
dilemma of decision-makers between short-term economic stability and long-term 413 
environmental sustainability (Jackson, 2009). 414 
                                                          
13  Compare, for example, Demaria, Schneider, Sekulova, & Martinez-Alier (2013), Jackson (2009); 
Latouche (2009); Miegel(2011). 
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Analogously to BV, however, DG requires cultural preconditions to be fulfilled before it can 415 
be translated into an effective political program. There is a danger that premature 416 
institutionalization of the DG programme in the form of a political party would lead into the 417 
trap of mere ‘politicking’, i.e. political actors becoming divorced from social realities and 418 
being trapped in the political game (Latouche, 2009).  419 
The growth-critical community is a heterogeneous group with its own internal diversity 420 
(D’Alisa et al., 2014; Schmelzer, 2015), whose composition varies according to particular 421 
spatial settings: liberal-reformists, subsistence-based, capitalism-critical
14
, and feminist strands 422 
can be identified within the discursive spectrum, and, in some places, even a conservative 423 
strand, represented, for example, by Meinhard Miegel in Germany or Alain de Benoist in 424 
France. All of these positions illuminate important shortcomings of growth-based societies 425 
and economies, and all prioritize particular transformative agents, instruments and points of 426 
intervention.  427 
We argue that it is in particular the liberal-reformist strand, that is a social reformist, 428 
ecologically-driven critique of economic growth (partly supported by established 429 
organizations in the environmental and development sectors), that holds more promise of 430 
spearheading dialogue with mainstream economic critique, thus opening the door to a 431 
broader acceptance for more fundamental questioning. While ecologically uncompromising 432 
and socially emancipatory, this approach remains institutionally conservative, as it seeks to 433 
transform existing structures that are essential to a liberal world-order, rather than dispensing 434 
                                                          
14  Worthwhile mentioning within the capitalist-critical strand is the search for an alliance between the 
Degrowth movement and the movement for Climate Justice: https://www.degrowth.de/en/2017/02/no-
degrowth-without-climate-justice/ 
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with them altogether (Schmelzer, 2015). Basic guidelines for a political economy here are 435 
the reduction of energy- and resource-consumption in accordance to science-informed 436 
sustainability goals, hence forcefully dropping GDP growth as a valid criterion to guide 437 
political action. The distinctive demand from this strand of thought, however, refers to the 438 
restructuration of growth-dependent and growth-driving institutions and infrastructures such 439 
as pension systems, health care, education, work, fiscal structures (with eco-taxes playing an 440 
important role), let alone financial markets. In this approach, GDP-contraction is not viewed 441 
as a goal in itself, but rather as a likely outcome of abandoning the growth-orientation of 442 
political economy in compliance with ecological imperatives.  443 
The controversy about decoupling GDP growth from ecological degradation is thus 444 
circumvented, rather than resolved. Indeed: questioning the growth-orientation on ecological 445 
and social grounds shift the terrain of the debate away from technological speculations 446 
towards issues of risk of ecological destabilization, on the one hand, and convenience/ 447 
desirability, on the other, drawing on the historically unfulfilled promises of decoupling 448 
growth from ecological degradation and coupling it (back) with wellbeing and happiness. To 449 
that extent, there is an evident affinity with the Sen/Nussbaum-inspired discourse of HD, 450 
and, for that matter, also with BV – insofar the state works as an instance of 451 
institutionalization in all cases – and with other counter-hegemonic struggles in the South. 452 
Indeed, while many anti-systemic movements and intellectuals from the global South do 453 
share the negative assessment of a growth-oriented politics
15
, they would not straightforwardly 454 
endorse the prescription of a contraction in economic output as solution (Brand, 2015). 455 
                                                          
15  Indeed, radical transformative concepts such as post-extractivism (Acosta, 2014) and post-
development (Escobar, 1995; Esteva, 2009; Sachs, 2010; Ziai, 2012) stem from the global south, yet they 
articulate a critical and utopian narrative in terms of post-colonialism and post-capitalism, rather than DG 
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In the following section, we argue that – if strategically articulated, this convergence might lay 456 
the foundation for a political transformation, as their aims of redefining progress and 457 
transforming society are complementary (Escobar, 2015). In the case of the Global South, 458 
the main challenge is not downscaling the production and consumption – as is the case in 459 
the industrialized world –, but developing a model that does not rely on the economic growth 460 
for the attainment of ecological and social goals.  461 
5.3. Human Development: sketching out the political transformation 462 
While doubtlessly less innovative from a cultural perspective than BV and DG, and lacking 463 
any in-depth analysis of the endemic inbuilt unsustainability in Western-style, globalized 464 
economies, the CA of Sen/Nussbaum does hold, in turn, deeper resonance with established 465 
political views, both in international as well as in national and local political circles.  466 
Viewed from a perspective of strategic dialogue, its academic and political respectability 467 
deliver the key resource of access to mainstream discursive arenas. From the perspective of 468 
its transformative potential, HD holds promise insofar change agents informed by BV and 469 
DG manage to tap into the transformative “surplus of meaning” (Muraca, 2014) of core 470 
liberal values such as freedom, autonomy, individuality, emancipation on which HD builds. 471 
Indeed, ecological sustainability doesn’t need to be framed as constraining freedom, for 472 
example, but rather as preserving it for future generations and restoring it to the disfranchised 473 
in today’s world – be these materially deprived populations in the global South or the 474 
alienated individuals of the rich countries in the north –, as the CA suggests. Feminist scholar 475 
                                                          
(Brand, 2015), although a dialogue among both perspectives – at least in the academic sphere – is incipient (see 
for example Acosta, 2014; Brand, 2015; Escobar, 2015; Monni and Pallottino, 2015; Wichterich, 2013). 
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Uta von Winterfeld (2011), for example, has interestingly advanced such a positive framing 476 
through the concept of “right to sufficiency”: in a world where consumption has become the 477 
central means of social differentiation, both identity-building and social acceptance become 478 
increasingly associated with part-taking in the consumerist frenzy. Those voluntarily pursuing 479 
materially frugal (i.e. ecologically sustainable) lifestyles are systematically exposed to lack of 480 
societal recognition, that is: they suffer from a form of social discrimination. She therefore 481 
advocates affirmative action in favour of sufficient lifestyles invoking liberal values of equality 482 
and freedom, with the slogan “nobody should be forcefully made to wanting to have ever 483 
more”. 484 
In addition, the dominant notion of freedom as a lack of constraints from the environment 485 
(‘negative freedom’) should be de-emphasized in favour of an understanding of freedom as 486 
potential for intervening onto this very environment (‘positive freedom’), which is enshrined 487 
in the notion of ‘capabilities’ and in the overall focus of strengthening people’s agency. This 488 
reconceptualization of discourses of development could surely benefit from discursive cross-489 
pollination with DG and BV. Provided this work of re-elaboration proves successful, HD 490 
could hold the political key to help replace a growth-oriented politics by an approach centred 491 
on (contingent and politically defined) human needs, democratization and pluralization of 492 
the economy and dematerialization of lifestyles.  493 
In conclusion, the three discourses analysed complement and need each other if a “Great 494 
transformation” to sustainability is to succeed: BV providing the reservoir of the boldest 495 
cultural innovation; DG offering detailed analysis about technically up-scalable forms of 496 
macro- and micro- socio-economic organization; and HD the potential docking points with 497 
mainstream cultural and political values and discourse. 498 
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 499 
 500 
Figure 1. Synthesis of the main features and weaknesses of the three discourses 501 
 502 
Source: own elaboration 503 
 504 
6. Further pragmatic considerations towards a fruitful dialogue between BV, DG, and HD  505 
The three discourses under consideration carry diverse symbolic and material markers which 506 
stem from their respective socio-cultural contexts of emergence: they are to be seen as 507 
situated discursive productions. The obstacles that transformative discourses face are not to 508 
be located mainly in a lack of conceptual or analytical clarity, but rather in the particularities 509 
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of diverse geo-historical contexts and contingent moments, with their varying political and 510 
socio-cultural connectivity points (Brand, 2015). 511 
In this regard, the greatest disparity can be safely said to separate BV, on the one hand, and 512 
DG and HD, on the other. Indeed: BV is heavily influenced by the specific socio-historical 513 
heritage of the Latin-American region – and the Andean-Amazonian countries, more 514 
specifically –, as well as by their geopolitical and geo-economic situations in the 515 
(semi)periphery of the globalized capitalist economy. Historical experience of direct and 516 
structural oppression, exclusion, or subordination has left a strong cultural imprint leading 517 
to an unwavering discursive foregrounding of power relations and imbalances, more than is 518 
the case with most growth-critical approaches, and even more so vis-à-vis HD.  519 
From a southern vantage point, capitalism is framed not only as a system of production and 520 
consumption, but first and foremost as a system of power and domination (not least over 521 
nature) (Brand, 2015, p. 29). Furthermore, five hundred years of colonial experience in Latin 522 
America have left ‘open veins’ also in issues of cultural identity, with the reassertion of native 523 
cultures and traditions constituting a main discursive vector in BV, as well as the stronger 524 
emphasis on territorial struggles as a (meta-)physical space for collective organization, self-525 
determination, identity, and belonging. To varying degrees and qualities, this applies not only 526 
to indigenous communities (or nations), but to peasants and suburban slum-dwellers, as well. 527 
Such focus on territory is absent from the two northern discourses. In addition, this discursive 528 
strand is comparatively more collectivistic and less anthropocentric than the two Northern 529 
ones (Escobar, 2015). 530 
At the same time, however, the development ideology is deeply anchored in the political 531 
identity of Latin American countries, whereby questioning growth would be counter-532 
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commonsensical and find little resonance in larger public debates. Much of the critical and 533 
combative energy in social movements and intellectuals comes from frustration derived from 534 
maldevelopment (Svampa and Viale, 2014; Tortosa, 2001), characterized by alienation, 535 
social inequity and ecological unsustainability; i.e., frustration with the unfulfilled promises 536 
of development, rather than with the idea of development itself.  537 
Furthermore, and largely as a result of the position of the sub-continent in the scheme of 538 
international division of labour, transformative processes in Latin America are focused on 539 
production and distribution, rather than on consumption. The already mentioned structural 540 
dependency of Latin American economies on the export of raw materials tightly constrains 541 
the room for manoeuvre (although that which is actually available can hardly be said to have 542 
been already exhausted). 543 
The two above described discursive trends in Latin America trigger various and partly 544 
contradictory demands and claims. Such contradictions are, in turn, reflected in the policy 545 
landscape of the respective countries: territorial and identity issues are the hallmark of rural 546 
peasant and indigenous communities, while a more classical left-distributive approach rather 547 
characterizes the urban working-class and partly also bourgeois liberal milieus making out 548 
the expanding consumer class. The former are discursively represented mainly by 549 
indigenous and critical intellectuals, while the latter finds expression prevalently in pragmatist 550 
political spheres (Vanhulst and Beling, 2014).  551 
Yet the expansion of the middle class in Latin American so-called “emergent countries” 552 
(most spectacularly, but not exclusively, Brazil), as well as in other countries of the Southern 553 
hemisphere, is causing the expansion of imported, Western-style consumption patterns, 554 
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somewhat blurring the line between North and South
16
, and thus – relevantly for our 555 
argument – bringing issues and problems informing the three discourses ever closer towards 556 
convergence. 557 
Yet although it is widely acknowledged that the material conditions of life in the Global South 558 
need to be improved, many traditions of thought such as post-colonialism, have argued that 559 
growth is part of the problem, rather than the solution to the social and ecological issues. 560 
Likewise, it is important to keep in mind that, recalling both postcolonial and Dependency 561 
Theory, the prevailing conditions in the Global South and North are mutually determining, 562 
as two sides of the same coin. Because of this, it is relevant “to resist falling into the trap, 563 
from northern perspectives, of thinking that while the North needs ‘degrowth’, the South 564 
needs ‘development’. Conversely, from southern perspectives, it is important to avoid the 565 
fallacy that degrowth is ‘‘ok for the North’’, but that the South needs rapid growth, whether 566 
to catch up with rich countries, satisfy the needs of the poor, or reduce inequalities” (Escobar, 567 
2015, p. 456).  568 
The rejection of the growth-imperative in the North would imply a reconfiguration of 569 
international trade that may drive a shift in the productive matrix of the South, which is 570 
mainly primary and highly dependent on exports to the North. In geopolitical terms, the 571 
denial of the developmentalist discourse of international aid can create an opportunity for 572 
moving away from a view of globalization as the universalization of Western-style modernity 573 
                                                          
16  The inter- and intra-societal heterogenization of socio-economic markers has blurred territorial fault 
lines separating the “Global South” from the “Global North”, which thus become more of socio-economic than 
of geographic categories. 
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and, in consequence, the rise of alternatives of/to development towards a plural economy in 574 
a plural world – a pluriverse (Escobar, 2015; Gudynas, 2011).  575 
 576 
7. Conclusion  577 
In the introduction to this article we provocatively argued that while the EE community has 578 
been relatively receptive to development-heterodox transformation discourses, it has hitherto 579 
failed to systematically foster a fruitful debate and cross-fertilization among them. Alongside 580 
this dialogical research- and intervention-line advocated by leading authors in the discussion 581 
on a global social-ecological transformation (i.a. Acosta, 2014; Brand, 2015; Escobar, 2015), 582 
we have sought to show promising ideational and pragmatic avenues to advance 583 
conversations, complementarities, and alliances among three discursive strongholds within 584 
the EE literature (though by no means the only ones worthwhile exploring in terms of 585 
dialogic-transformational potential). At the same time, with its transdisciplinary, cross-586 
territorial base, and its critical tradition of weaker, utilitaristic conceptions of sustainability, as 587 
well as its sourcing from post-development thought, we have sought to make the case for the 588 
EE community embracing the role of becoming a privileged platform for such discursive 589 
synergies between HD, DG, and BV to unfold. 590 
 591 
The goal of this article was creating a ‘discursive bridge’ between the global mainstream 592 
(represented here by HD), on the one hand, and two radical transformation discourses in 593 
the tradition of post-development, on the other – each standing as representative for the 594 
south (BV) and from the north (DG) –; showing concrete possible forms of ideational and 595 
pragmatic articulation. The lowest common denominator between DG and BV is to be 596 
found in the systemic interconnections and interdependencies of the globalized capitalist 597 
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economy, as well as social and cultural structures underpinning it. Hence, debates around 598 
BV and DG should be brought into convergence towards this common, systemic root of the 599 
issues both seek to address, re-framing them as two sides of the same coin (Acosta, 2014; 600 
Brand, 2015) and the possible ways to tackle them from such systemic perspective. Mutual 601 
support and understanding of complex and interdependent feedback loops would thus 602 
potentially enhance the efficacy of the respective local struggles (on which both discourses 603 
draw their legitimacy and the support-base needed to expand their influence) significantly.  604 
Taking into consideration the key situational and contextual markers of the discourses 605 
analysed here, some promising complementary features between BV and DG to enrich their 606 
respective understandings of the systemic interconnections would be, for example, amending 607 
BV’s focus on the centrality of territory with DG’s focus on global relationships and 608 
exchanges; the focus on production of the former with the focus on consumption of the 609 
latter, or else the focus on systemic interdependences (prominent in HD and DG) with that 610 
on power and domination (implicit in BV).  611 
At the level of cultural values, HD’s broadly defined aims also allow room for cross-612 
fertilization with DG and BV. The “surplus of meaning” of established liberal values (chiefly, 613 
‘freedom’) offers the most promising locus for a cross-fertilizing dialogue among the three 614 
discourses. The anti-utilitarian, celebrative ethos of BV resonates with the aspiration to 615 
freedom, and so do the (self-)sufficient, time-wealthy, and less individualistic lifestyles 616 
conveyed by DG. Out of the heterogenous DG strands, it is therefore the liberal-reformist 617 
strand (which is institutionally conservative yet ecologically uncompromising and socially 618 
emancipatory) that presents the clearest natural affinities for a dialogue with HD. We have 619 
further argued that, as a well-established discourse geared towards human flourishing, HD 620 
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holds potential for spearheading a shift in political climate towards a Great Transformation. 621 
Indeed, HD offers important keys as how to frame the issue in order to make it socially and 622 
politically acceptable: it’s all about enlarging the capabilities of current and future generations 623 
to live fulfilling lives – provided, of course, that there is a future for humanity on this planet, 624 
in the first place, which cannot be taken for granted any longer without fundamental 625 
transformations of the scale and scope envisaged in DG and BV.  626 
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